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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmABSTRACT 
In this paper, we analyze the service provided by the 13 largest U.S. passenger airlines to the 100 
most populous U.S. metropolitan areas in 1989. We classify the route systems by their nature and 
geographical extent using a variety of measures based on route-level data.  We then identify 
individual airline hub locations and derive and calculate several measures of the extent of 
competition both on individual routes and at the airports in our sample.  The results show the 
wide diversity of route networks that existed in the airline industry in  1989--a phenomenon that 
may help to explain the failure of several major carriers since then. 
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Beginning with the Airline Deregulation Act of  1978, airlines have been constructing route 
networks of their own choosing rather than operating ones implicitly chosen for them by the Civil 
Aeronautics ~oard.  l  This regulatory reform has led to the development of hub-and-spoke 
networks.  As its name implies; a hub-and-spoke network has most flights coming to a "hub" 
airport from "rim" airports, concentrating airline activity at a few locations. Travel between two 
rim airports involves flying first to the hub and then on to the final destination. 
This change in the nature of route systems has important implications for the performance 
of the air transportation system, because airports receive widely varying levels of  service and have 
very different levels of concentration, depending on whether the facility is a hub or not.  Another 
important implication is that capacity constraints are much more likely to be binding as a direct 
result of the concentration of  activity at hubs, possibly leading to congestion and delays for 
passengers. 
The evolution of  United Airlines' route network from 1965 to 1989 (see figure 1) 
illustrates the development of  hub-and-spoke systems. In 1965, United had a route system 
characterized by many multistop flights. By 1989, however, it employed an extensive hub-and- 
spoke network comprising mostly nonstop and one-stop flights. 
For the airlines, there are many advantages to switching to a hub-and-spoke network. 
Kanafani and Ghobrial(1985) pointed out that this system enables airlines to take advantage of 
economies of aircraft size, Toh and Higgins (1985) found an increase in airline profitability, and 
McShan and Windle (1989) reported significant cost savings. 
But the airlines are not the only ones to benefit from the adoption of hub-and-spoke 
networks. Morrison and Winston (1986) found that passengers have benefited from airline 
deregulation mainly through increased flight frequency, which is a direct result of  the increase in 
hub-and-spoke activity.  Butler and Huston (1990) examined service to small nonhub airports 
l~or  a broader &scussion of  the evolution of the U.S.  airline industry after deregulation, see Borenstein (1992). 
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benefited from more-frequent flights to a hub airport, even though service to nonhub facilities has 
been curtailed. Due to this change, passengers originating from small nonhub airports can reach 
many more destinations on a one-stop-or-less flight than before.  Even the oft-heard complaint 
about fewer nonstop flights is more perception than reality.  Barnett et al. (1992) discovered that 
a 1989 traveler was far more likely to find a timely nonstop jet flight than was her 1977 
counterpart, even after adjusting for the growth in passenger traffic since 1977. 
While the net benefits to passengers from the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks have 
been substantial, not all passengers have fared equally. Travel times for those who lost nonstop 
service have increased, and passengers originating from hub airports or facilities with severe 
capacity constraints face higher fares than they otherwise would.  In the case of hub airports, 
travelers are at least partially compensated by receiving service to relatively more nonstop 
destinations and by more frequent nonstop flights to those destinations (for further details, see 
Huston and Butler [1988]). 
So far, we have discussed hub-and-spoke networks as something that either exists or does 
not.  Actual flight schedules are less clear cut, however, since airlines vary in the extent to which 
they employ such networks.  Even before the regulatory reforms of the late 1970s, many airlines 
engaged in some activity characteristic of the hub-and-spoke system. Given the importance of  the 
hub-and-spoke phenomenon, pinpointing the nature and effect of the new route structures is 
necessary not only for understanding recent changes in the airline industry, but also for 
anticipating the changes that are likely to occur in the future. 
There has been some work aimed at developing objective measures of the extent to which 
airlines have adopted hub-and-spoke networks. The Toh and Higgins (TH) index is calculated as 
the number of cities served by  a previously identified hub divided by the number of spoke routes 
extending from it.  If an airline has more than one hub, each is assigned a weight based on the 
proportion of cities in the airline's route system that it serves. 
Alternatively, the McShan and Windle (MW) index is the proportion of an airline's total 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmdepartures leaving from the 3 percent most utilized airports in its network.  For example, if an 
airline serves 100 airports, the proportion of the carrier's total departures from the three airports 
with the most-flights would be computed. 
The TH and MW indexes are calculated using individual airline data for 1982 and 1970- 
84, respectively. While both indexes provide quantitative information on hub-and-spoke systems, 
each has limitations. For instance, the TH index must assign rim airports to a particular hub--an 
arbitrary decision for rim airports with flights to multiple hubs.  Also, both indexes try to capture 
a complex, multidimensional activity with a single scalar measure. 
Our objective in this paper is to overcome these limitations and provide a better 
understanding of the hub-and-spoke phenomenon by rigorously examining the route networks of 
the 13  largest U.S. carriers in 1989. First, we classify these airlines' route systems by their nature 
and geographical extent using a variety of measures based on route-level data.  We then identify 
individual airline hub locations using an index derived from the same data.  Finally, we derive and 
calculate several measures of the extent of competition both on individual routes and at the 
airports in our sample.  The results show the wide diversity of route networks that existed in the 
airline industry in 1989--a phenomenon that may help to explain the failure of  several of the 
carriers since then. 
I.  The Data 
Our unique data set is the key to the various measures of hub-and-spoke activity 
developed here.  We acquired the 1989 flight schedules for the 13 largest domestic carriers--Air 
Alaska, America West, American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Midway, Northwest, 
Southwest, TWA, United, and USAir--which together accounted for more than 90 percent of the 
U.S. market for scheduled service that year (based on revenue passenger miles). 
Using these, we constructed a matrix describing which airports are linked by nonstop air 
service for each carrier.  A one in the i, j-th element indicates that  the carrier offers service from 
the i-th airport to the j-th airport, whereas a zero indicates no service. While the data do not 
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route networks not available in other data sets.2 
Our sample is composed of the 112 airports located in the 100 most populated 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MsAs).~  There are more airports than MSAs because some areas 
contain multiple airports.  MSAs with more than one airport are listed in table 1. 
II.  Airline Classification 
Our goal in this section is to classify the selected airlines by geographic extent, scale of 
operations, and type of route structure.  We report the results of our classifications in table 2, 
columns 1 and 2. In general, our method is to construct measures of a particular quality of route 
networks, and then to rely on large gaps in these measures to assign airlines to the various 
categories. 
The key variable in classifying an  airline's geographic extent is the percentage of its flights 
that depart and arrive within the same or adjacent U.S. census divisions (column 3).4  Air Alaska 
and Southwest have much higher regional concentrations than the other airlines and are 
designated "regional carriers."  The others are designated "national carriers" not because they 
necessarily serve the entire country, but because they serve a much larger portion of the country 
than the  regional^.^  The contrast between regional and national carriers is well illustrated by 
2~or  example, McShan and Windle (1989) used annual departure data disaggregated by airlines and airports, but 
gathered no infomation on the destination of those depamres. 
3~he  sample includes 12,432 possible routes, but we collected data for only half of these and assumed that service 
was symmemc. For example, we gathered data for the route from Portland to Atlanta and assumed that if an 
airline serviced this route, then it also serviced the Atlanta-Portland route.  To check this assumption, we selected 
one airline (American) and collected data for routes in both directions. For this case, the symmetry assumption 
was valid in all but one instance. 
4~he  nine census divisions are New England, Middle Atlantic. South Atlantic, East South Central, East North 
Central, West South Central. West North Central. Mountain, and Pacific. 
50ur definition of national carriers should not be confused with the Deparrment of Transportation's designation, 
which is based solely on an airline's total revenue. 
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We further classify the national airlines on the basis of scale of operations, looking at the 
number of airports that each serves (column 4).  There appear to be three distinct size classes: 
large carriers that serve 89 or more airports, medium carriers that serve about 70 airports, and 
- 
small carriers that serve fewer than 55 airports. 
An alternative measure of an airline's scale of operations would be the number of nonstop 
routes that it flies (column 5).  Using this criterion, our size classifications for the national carriers 
would be unaltered.  Large carriers serve 400 or more nonstop routes; medium carriers, around 
300; and small carriers, around 100. Of the two regional carriers, Southwest, with 134 nonstop 
routes, is more than twice the size of Air Alaska. If the census divisions had been drawn a little 
differently, Midway might have been classified as a regional carrier and Southwest a national. We 
prefer our stated classifications, because the area served by Midway contains a much larger share 
of the U.S. population than that served by Southwest. 
Some characteristics of the nature of service provided by the airlines in our sample (and 
the total U.S. airline network) are reported in columns 6 to 9.  We calculate the percentage of the 
12,432 possible routes for which an airline offered no service, nonstop service, one-stop service, 
or two-or-more-stop service. 
Two important inferences can be culled from these measures. First, the size classifications 
developed above would be unaltered if we categorized airlines by the number of routes that 
received some level of service.  Large carriers offered at least partial service to two-thirds of the 
total possible routes; medium carriers, only 40 to 50 percent; small carriers, 10 to 25 percent; and 
regional carriers, 10 percent or less. 
Second, only one-fifth of all airport pairs received nonstop service from at least one carrier 
(of course, these tended to be the most frequently flown routes).  The most common level of 
service for an airport pair was one-stop (about three-fourths of all flights).  Only 5 percent of the 
possible routes--those least frequently flown--required more than a one-stop flight . 
Next, we turn to our measures of the type of route structure, the most complex 
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national carriers, but also demonstrates the contrast between two very different airline route 
networks:  Southwest's, which is a relatively diffuse network, and Northwest's, whose three hubs 
(Detroit, Minneapolis, and Memphis) clearly stand out. 
To better understand our terminology, consider figure 3, which depicts four hypothetical 
route systems (mono-hub, dual-hub, and two diffuse systems) each serving six airports. With a 
pure mono-hub network, all of an airline's flights originate or anive at a central location.  A multi- 
hub is similar, but has two or more airports at which activity is concentrated.  Finally, there are 
many possible types of diffuse route networks, ranging fiom each airport offering nonstop service 
to all other airports, to a network in which there is a relatively smooth decline in the level of 
service offered to the most connected to the least connected airports. 
The measures in columns 10 to 13  represent the percentage of an airline's routes that 
originate from its one, two, four, and six most connected airports.  When using these measures, 
different criteria must be employed for airlines of different sizes.  The reason for this is that with 
small carriers such as Air Alaska, six airports may represent more than a third of the total number 
of  locations served, while for large airlines such as American, the corresponding percentage 
would be considerably less (under 3 percent). The MW index overcomes this problem by looking 
only at the share of departures from the 3 percent most utilized airports, thus automatically 
adjusting for the size of  the network.6 
In a pure mono-hub system (see figure 3), 50 percent of an airline's routes would originate 
in its most connected airport (the other half would terminate there).  Because actual airline 
operations are less clear cut, an n-airport route concentration of 35 percent or greater (depending 
6~ minor difficulty is that this approach results in an integer problem, because n airports may fall short of 3 
percent, while n+l may exceed 3 percent.  McShan and Windle (1989) employ linear interpolation to overcome 
this drawback. 
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From table 2, we can see that airlines rely on hub-and-spoke systems to varying extents. 
Midway is the closest to being a pure mono-hub, with 48.6 percent of its routes originating at 
Chicago Midway airport (only one of the airline's routes does not originate or end there).  We 
also classify Eastern Airlines as a mono-hub system.  Although its one-airport concentration is 
only 38.1 percent, it has no significant concentration of  activity at any of the other airports it 
serves.  For both Eastern and Midway, fewer than 6 percent of their routes originate from the 
second most connected airport. 
The dual-hub carriers (TWA, Braniff, and America West) are identified by the large share 
of departures at their two most connected airports.  At least 26 percent of their routes originate 
from the most connected airport, and more than 9 percent originate from the second most 
connected airport. 
The multi-hub carriers (American, Delta, Northwest, United, and Continental) have one- 
airport concentrations of  13 percent or more, and their four-airport measures are at least 13 
percentage points higher than their two-airport concentrations. 
USAir is the only diffuse national carrier.  At each route concentration level, its measures 
are significantly lower than those of the other large national carriers.  Its six-airport concentration 
measure is only 33.6 percent, compared to an average of 45.7 percent for the other large 
nationals.  Perhaps this is why several of USAir's 1989 hubs no longer receive hub service. 
Hardest hit was Dayton's airport, which has lost three-fourths of its nonstop destinations since 
1989. Cleveland Hopkins International has also been severely affected, losing about half of its 
nonstop flights over the same period.  Some restructuring of USAir's route network was'to be 
expected, because in 1989, the merger with Piedmont had not been fully consummated, and the 
two airlines' route networks had not yet been fully rationalized. Still, the economics of hub-and- 
7~he  hub index developed in the next section yields a similar classification of airline route networks and also 
identifies airline hub locations. 
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Air Alaska and Southwest were likewise found to have relatively diffuse route networks, 
once their small size was taken into account.  Both airlines do have some hub-and-spoke 
components, but their operations are not nearly as concentrated as those of the nondiffuse 
carriers. 
For comparison, we report a modified MW index in column 14.  Instead of the share of 
total departures at an airport, we look at the share of total routes. The reported value for a 
particular airline indicates the proportion of its routes originating from the 3 percent most 
connected airports in its network, with larger values corresponding to greater centralization. 
While the MW single-valued measure does accurately reflect the degree of hub-and-spoking 
behavior, it cannot be used to determine the number of hub airports an airline has. 
111.  Airline Hub Locations 
We now turn our attention toward examining the route networks from the perspective of 
the airports rather than the airlines.  In particular, we look at where airlines have located their 
hubs and analyze the characteristics of overall service provided there. 
First, for each airline and airport, we construct an index of  hub activity that measures the 
degree to which the airport is connected to the rest of the airline's network.  In a hub-and-spoke 
system, we would expect to find that most airports are not well connected, with only a few hub 
airports diverging from this pattern. 
Our hub index for an airport is the percentage of  other airports in a given airline's route 
system that can be reached with nonstop service.  For example, passengers originating from hub 
airport (C) in figure 3's mono-hub network can reach 100 percent of the other airports, while only 
20 percent of the other airports can be reached from airports A, B, D, E, or F.  The corresponding 
values for the route concentration measures are included for comparison. 
In the dual-hub network, both hub airports (C and D) have an index of  100 percent.  The 
other facilities in the network have hub indexes of only 40 percent. 
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across airports.  In the first, every airport offers nonstop service to every other location and the 
hub index is 100  percent for every airport.  In the second, some airports are more connected than 
others, but there is no discrete jump in the hub-index values, unlike the case with the two 
hypothetical hub networks.  We characterize the airports with the most nonstop service as hubs, 
but the distinction between hub and nonhub service is more arbitrary in this hypothetical example. 
For the 44 airport-airline combinations (out of a possible 837) that we classified as hubs, 
the value of the hub index is reported in table 3 (column 7), along with some other information 
about the airlines' level and quality of service (columns 3 to 6). Note that the demand for air 
transportation at some airports is sufficient to support more than one airline with hub activity. 
To determine hub locations using this index, we examined the distributions of the hub 
index for each airline.  They range from a high of  100 percent (Midway Airlines at Chicago 
Midway airport) to a low of  17 percent (United Airlines at Los Angeles International).  Figure 4 
displays these distributions. 
Every carrier concentrates its service in a relatively small number of airports, making it 
easy to identify hub locations. Only a handful of airports had very high service levels, with most 
offering comparatively low levels. The exceptions were the hubs of the relatively diffuse carriers 
(Air Alaska, USAir, and Southwest). These airlines do concentrate their activity in a small 
number of airports, but there is a relatively smooth progression fiom the least served to the most 
served locations. Thus, determining the lower bound of what constitutes hub service for these 
carriers is more difficult. We set an arbitrary cutoff point for each carrier based on where there 
was a gap in the index between airports with higher versus lower levels of service.  Purports 
offering levels of service above this threshold were designated as hubs. 
The locations of the metropolitan areas with the 44 hub airport-airline combinations are 
shown in figure 5.  Airports located in the east central portion of the country appear to have a 
distinct advantage in acquiring hub status, due to population densities. 
Individual airport-airline hubs differ in terms of the breadth of the areas they serve. To 
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the percentage of an airline's nonstop connections from the hub airport to destinations in either the 
same U.S. census division or neighboring divisions.  The results, presented in column 4 of table 3, 
range from a high of 100 to a low of 44, with a median of 75. For example, American Airlines' 
Chicago O'Hare hub serves points throughout the country, while activity at its Raleigh-Durham 
hub is  concentrated in the east (see figure 6). 
IV.  Measures of Competition 
If  the airline industry were perfectly contestable, there would be no point in calculating 
any measures of the extent of competition, since such indexes would have no meaning8  Because 
no one has found that the airline industry meets these conditions, we construct various indexes of 
the extent of competition based on the number of caniers offering service on a route or, 
alternatively, from an airport9  A drawback common to all of these indexes is that infrequent 
service on a route is treated as equivalent to more frequent service. 
We calculate several indexes of the degree of competition faced by each airline at its hubs 
(as identified in table 3).  The first is the percentage of routes on which the airline faces 
competition, calculated separately for nonstop and one-stop connections (columns 8 and 9).10 
For example, in 1989 Delta faced competition from at least one other airline on 67 percent of its 
79 routes that originate from its largest hub, Atlanta's Hartsfield airport.  However, for the 100 
one-stop or fewer routes served from Atlanta, Delta had at least one competitor on all of them. 
8~ market is perfectly contestable if the threat of entry into the industry is sufficient to keep prices equal to 
marginal costs, even when there are as few as two existing firms (see Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 119821). 
91.n fact. most studies have shown that the more competitors there are on a route, the lower fares tend to be (see 
Bailey, Graham. and Kaplan [19851. Bauer and Zlatoper [1989], Borenstein [1989], Call and Keeler [1985], 
Hurdle et al. [1989]. and Morrison and Winston [1987]). 
lbhe  one-stop calculation involved an aggregation of the nonstop and one-stop data  For example, we considered 
a nonstop flight from New  Orleans to Denver on United Airlines to be competition for American Airlines' one-stop 
flight from New  Orleans to Denver via its Dallas hub.  We applied this same principle to all the one-stop measures 
of competition discussed in hs  paper. 
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of its nonstop routes (mostly from Delta).  This situation undoubtedly exacerbated Eastern's other 
financial problems and helped lead to its eventual demise. 
There is substantial variation in the percentage of nonstop routes having competition 
across airport-airline combinations (the range is 0 to 98 percent).ll  In contrast, the percentage of 
a hub's one-stop routes facing competition tends to be very large, with at least some competition 
on 88 percent of  the routes for all but one hub (Love Field). 
To gauge the quantity of competition at the hub airport-airline combinations, we also 
computed the average number of competitors on each route an airline serves.  These measures for 
nonstop and one-stop routes are displayed in columns 10 and 11 of table 3.  Note that with only 
three exceptions (USAir, United, and Delta's hub operations in Los Angeles), the average number 
of competitors on nonstop flights is less than two. 
The story is radically different for one-stop routes.  With only two exceptions,  the 
average number of competitors is greater than two.  The difference between nonstop and one-stop 
competition is to be expected, since the hub-and-spoke networks adopted by most airlines allow 
them all to compete with one another on most one-stop routes. 
Next, instead of looking at the amount of competition airlines encounter at their busier 
airports, we construct measures of competition from the perspective of  a passenger at a particular 
airport.  For each of the 112 airports in our sample, table 4 reports several such measures.  First, 
the level of overall service at an airport is indicated by the number of airports that can be reached 
by nonstop and one-stop flights (columns 2 and 3).  Columns 4 and 5 report the percentage of 
these routes served by more than one carrier for nonstop and one-stop service.  For example, of 
the 47 nonstop routes from Baltimore-Washington airport, 26 percent have competition, while 97 
l l~he  zeros occur at only three airports--Dallas1  Love Field, Chicago's Midway, and Dayton.  Carriers at the first 
two airports face stiff competition from other airports in the metropolitan area, so high concentrations at these 
airports pose little cause for concern.  Dayton's situation in 1989 was unique in that it was blessed by receiving a 
major carrier's service, but cursed by attracting only one. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpercent of the 64 one-stop connections are served by more than one carrier.  On average, more 
than one carrier serves 28 percent of the nonstop routes and 84 percent of the one-stop routes. 
The average number of competitors on nonstop and one-stop routes from each airport are 
reported in columns 6 and 7, respectively.  The values for nonstop connections range from 1.0 to 
2.2, with a mean of  1.4.  For one-stop routes, the figures range from 1.0 to 5.9, with a mean of 
3.8. Again, there is more competition on the one-stop level than on the nonstop level for all of the 
airports. 
Two additional measures of the overall degree of  competition at each airport are 
computed based on the Herfindahl index.12  In columns 8 and 9, we report the nonstop and one- 
stop Herfindahl index, computed as 
HO, = 10,000. x  servicer  servicer  , 
I  [  I,  J 
where servicei, is the number of nonstop routes from airport i for the jth airline. This measure is 
sensitive only to the level of service, not to the actual destinations of the service.  The measure for 
one-stop connections was calculated in a similar manner. 
The main limitation of these estimates is that they are not sensitive to the destinations of 
the routes.  For example, suppose an airport has 10 airlines, each serving 10 other airports with 
no overlap.  In  this case, there is no route-by-route competition, yet HO will be equal to 1,000, its 
theoretical minimum for 10 carriers.  This is an appropriate measure of the degree of competition 
at the airport only if potential competition from carriers serving the facility (but not the same 
routes) is very strong.  Otherwise, route-by-route measures of competition must be developed (as 
we do below).  This is an issue we can explore only because of our unique data set.  From the 
example above, it is clear that airport-level and route-level measures of competition can yield very 
12The Herfindah1 index is a measure of concentration, with larger values corresponding to greater concentration. 
For a description of this measure. see Koch (1980, pp. 179-180). 
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To develop an overall measure of competition at the airport level that is sensitive to the 
actual level of competition on a route-by-route basis, we computed another version of the 
Herfmdahl index as 
./ 
HHO,,  = 10,000  -  (serviced?  see  ) , 
j 
where serviceijk is one if the jth airline services the route from i to k, and zero otherwise.13 
HHOik is the nonstop Herfindahl index for the route between airport i and airport k.  To get an 
overall measure for each airport, we used the average of HHOik computed over all airports k. 
This index assumes that only airlines offering service on the same route are effective potential 
competitors. 
The resulting indexes for nonstop and one-stop connections are reported in table 4, 
columns 10 and 11.  While these measures are sensitive to the route-by-route patterns of 
competition, they are not affected by the actual level of service (as measured by the number of 
airports that can be reached with a nonstop connection), since only routes with at least some 
service are included in the calculation. 
Although a Herfindahl index of 3,200 would be considered very high in most industries 
(i.e., the Department of Justice's antimerger guidelines would take effect), there is reason to treat 
this as a somewhat moderate level for the airlines. For example, Bauer and Zlatoper (1989) found 
that air fares cease to fall once three carriers serve a route--equivalent to a Herfindahl index of 
roughly 3,200 using our definitions. 
V.  Summary 
In this paper, we analyzed the service provided by the 13 largest U.S. passenger airlines to 
the 100 most populous U.S. metropolitan areas in 1989.  Using route-specific data from that year, 
13~t  least some service had to be offered on a route for it to be included in this calculation. 
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on aggregate departure information. 
Using this route-specific data, we developed measures to categorize the airlines in terms 
of geographic scope and route structure. We also determined the location of airline hubs and 
computed various measures of the intensity of competition at individual airports; 
We found many differences among the 13 airlines in tern  of geographic scope and route 
structure. Only two were primarily regional in their coverage, while the others were more 
national in scope.  Among the latter carriers, we found significant variation in the number of 
routes that they serve. Although all 13 airlines have hub-and-spoke systems, differences were 
shown to exist in the degree of centralization. Two (Eastern and Midway) operated mono-hub 
networks; three (TWA, Braniff, and America West) flew dual-hub networks; five (American, 
Delta, Northwest, United, and Continental) managed complex multi-hub networks; and three 
(USAir, Air Alaska, and Southwest) served diffuse networks. 
To determine the location of the hub airports for each airline, we computed the percentage 
of the other airports in the airline's route system that can be reached with nonstop flights for each 
airport-airline combination. We then examined the distribution of  this index for each airline and 
identified as hubs those airports having large values. 
Forty-four airport-airline combinations in the sample were classified as hubs.  These 
combinations include only 35 different airports, since some of these facilities had more than one 
airline with hub activity.  While hub airports are found throughout the United States, they tend to 
be concentrated within roughly 500 miles of  Cincinnati.. Some of the hubs are predominantly 
regional in their orientation, while others are more national in scope. 
Finally, we computed several different measures of competition at the airports in the 
sample. These measures indicate that there was substantially more competition on one-stop 
routes than on nonstop routes, and that the level of competition at these facilities varied 
tremendously. 
Using our airport-airline competition measures, we found that the carriers in our 1989 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsample that have since failed (Braniff, Eastern, and Midway), as well as those that are currently 
experiencing the most financial difficulty (America West, Continental, and TWA), tended to face 
more competition at the airports they served than did the other carriers (although the sample is 
too small for rigorous testing).  It is possible that the type of route network operated by the failed 
carriers may not have been viable, since it is the large national and the regional airlines that have 
remained financially stronger. Survival in this competitive industry during the 1990s requires a 
large multihub route network or a solid regional niche. 
The number of airlines that have failed in  the last few years has some industry observers 
concerned.  Other things held constant, fewer carriers tend to mean less competition; however, 
other things have not remained constant in the airline industry.  The carriers that have survived 
tend to serve most of the airports in the system (e.g., compare the extent of United's route 
network in 1965 with its 1989 schedule).  Thus, effective competition has probably increased, 
since five large national carriers would offer more competition, route by route, than 12 smaller 
carriers serving more-restricted route networks. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 1.  United Airlines Route Structure, 1965 and 1989 
1965 
Source:  United Airlines schedule guides, 1965 and summer 1989. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 2.  Examples of Airline Route Structures 
Southwest Airlines 1989 Route Structure 
Northwest Airlines 1989 Route Structure 
Source:  Southwest and Northwest Airlines schedule guides, summer 1989. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 3.  Hypothetical Airline Route Structures 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 6.  Service at Selected American Airlines Hubs, 1989 
Chicago (O'Hare) Hub 
Raleigh-Durham Hub 
Source:  American Airlines schedule guide, summer 1989. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 1.  Metropolitan Areas with Multiple Airports 
Metropolitan Area  Auport 
Chicago-Gary-Lake County. IL-IN-WI CMSA 
Cleveland-Akron-Lorain,  OH CMSA 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CMSA 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX CMSA 
Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside, CA CMSA 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA 
New  York-N. New  Jersey-Long Island. NY -NJ-CT CMSA 
San Francisco-Oakland-San  Jose, CA CMSA 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater. FL MSA 
Washington, DC-MD-VA MSA 
Chicago Midway 
Chicago O'Hare 
Akron Canton Regional 
Cleveland Hopkins International 
Dallas Love Field 
Dallas Ft. Worth International 
William P.  Hobby 
Houston Intercontinental 
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena 
Los Angeles International 
Long Beach 
Ontario International 
John Wayne Airport 
Fort Lauderdale 
Miami International 
Long Island MacArthur 
Newark International 
John F. Kennedy International 
La Guardia 
Metropolitan Oakland 
San Francisco International 
San Jose International 
St. Petersburg-Clearwater 
Tampa International 
Washington National 'Airport 
Washington Dulles Airport 
Source: Authors' assignments. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2.  Selected Siailsilcs for  PrlnclpaI U.S.  Passenger Alrllnes 
I'ercet~tnae of Airport Pairs with  Percentage of Airline's Routes 
that Originate from 
Percentage  Airports  Nonstop  No  Nonstop  One-stop  Two-or-more- 
Airline  Type  Regional  Served  Routes  Service  Service  Service  stop Service  1 Airport  2  Airports  4 Airports  6 Airports  MW  Index 
[I  1  [2]  131  [4]  [S]  161  [7]  [a  1  191  [lo]  [I I]  [I  21  [I  31  [I 41 
Large National 
American  Mulli-hub  68.9  102  53 2  17.1  4.3  62.3  16.3  13.7  25.6  39.8  45.5  0.3331 
Delta  Multi-hub  74.3  101  592  18.8  4.8  59.7  16.8  13.3  22.1  36.7  43.2  0.3092 
Northwest  Mulli-hub  66.2  89  408  37.0  3.3  42.5  17.2  14.0  26.2  41.4  48.0  0.3394 
US  Air  1)ifiuse  78.7  89  752  37.0  6.0  39.9  17.1  8.5  15.3  25.9  .  33.6  0.1912 
United  Mulli-hub  71.8  100  496  20.4  4.0  60.5  15.0  16.9  26.0  39.9  .  46.0  0.3488 
Medium National 
Continental  Mulli-hub  65.9  7  1  328  60.0  2.6  25.6  11.8  14.0  25.0  43.0  50.0  0.2635 
TWA  Dual-hub  66.7  76  276  54.5  2.2  40.9  2.7  26.1  35.5  40.6  44.6  0.3632 
Small National 
Braniff  Dual-hub  71.7  43  106  85.5  0.9  11.7  1.9  35.8  47.2  50.9  54.7  0.391  3 
Eastern  Mono-hub  83.6  5  3  134  77.8  1.1  20.3  0.8  38.1  43.3  52.2  58.2  0.41  14 
Midway  Mono-hub  80.0  3  5  70  90.4  0.6  9.0  0.0  48.6  51.4  55.7  58.6  0.4871 
America West  Dual-hub  80.7  3  6  124  89.9  1 .O  8.5  0.6  26.6  47.6  52.4  57.3  0.2829 
Regional 
Au  Alaska  Diffuse  100.0  15  60  98.3  0.5  1 .O  0.2  21.7  38.3  53.3  66.7  0.0975 
Southwest  Diffuse  92.5  27  134  94.4  1.1  2.8  1.7  12.7  22.4  37.3  47.8  0.1028 
Total  Diffuse  71.0  112  2750  0.0  22.1  72.4  5.5  3.3  6.3  11.7  16.2  0.1003 
Sources:  Various airline service guides, summer 1989,  and authors' calculalions. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTahle 3.  Selected SlaIisIlo for Hub Alrporl-Airline Comhinallons, 1989 
Portland-Vancouver. OR-WA 
Seattle-Txoma. WA 
Chicagc~Gary-l.ake  County, n.-IN-WI  (O'llare) 
Dallas-Ft. Wd.  TX (International) 
Nashville. TN 
Raleigh-Durham.  NC 
Lar Vcgas. NV 
Phoenix. AZ 
Kansas City. MOKS 
Orlando, FL 
Cleveland-Abon-1.orain.  011 (Akron-Canton) 
Ilouston-Galveston-Brazuiq  TX (International) 
New Ymk-New Jersey-Long Island. NY-NJ-Cf  (Newark) 
Denver-Boulder. CO 
Atlanta.  GA 
Dal1as.Fr.  Wd.  TX (International) 
Cincinnati-tlmiltrm, OH-KY-IN 
Los hgclcs-hahcim-Riverside. CA (LA Internrdi<mal) 
Salt Lake City-Ogdcn, UT 
Atlanta.  GA 
Chicagc~Gary-Lake  County, IL-IN-WI  (Midway) 
Detroit-Ann Arbor. MI 
Memphis. TN-AR-MS 
Minneapolis-St. Paul. MN-Wl 
Dallas-Ft. Wod,  TX (Love Field) 
EI Paso. TX 
Phoenix. AZ 
Houston-Galveston-Brazai%  TX (tlobby) 
New Yuk-New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-(JT  (JFK) 
St. Louis. MOIL 
Cbicagc~Gary-Lake  County. IL-IN-WI  (O'Harc) 
Los hgclcs-Anaheim-Riverside. CA (LA Internrdional) 
San Frwcixo-Oakland-San  Jose. CA  (San Francisco) 
Denver-Boulder, CU 
Washington. DC-MD-VA (DuUcs) 
Baltimore. MD 
















































Nonstop  One-stop  Index 
Percentage of  Routes 
with Com~cti!b 
Avaagc Number 
Nonstop  One-siop 
[lo]  [I I] 
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Airprc  Airline 
Cleveland-Abon-Loraia, 011 (Akron-Canton) 
Pinsburgh-Beaver Valley. PA 
Indianapolis. IN 
Dayton-Springfield. 011 
Los hgeles-Anaheim-Riverside. CA ([.A  Intematicmal) 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trcoton.  PA-NJ-DE-h.U) 















Hub  Scrvicc 
Hub 
Nonstop  One-stop  Index 
151  (61  (71 
Perenrage of Routes 
Nonstop  One-slop 
[S]  19 1 
Average Numbel 
Sources:  Various airline schcdule guides, summer 1989, and aulhors'calculaticms. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4.  Concentration Statistics for Airports in Large Metropolitan Area, 1989 
Percentage of Routes  Average Number of  Ilerfindahl lndex  Herfindahl lndex 
with Con~~e~ith  er Route  lovemll service) 
Nonstop  One-slop 
Airport  (all airlines)  (all airlines)  Nonstop  One-stop  Nonstop  One-stop  Nonstop  One-stop  Nonstop  One-stop 
Ill  121  131  (41  [5]  161  [7]  [8]  [9]  [I 01  [lll 
Adams Field (Litle Rock. AK) 
Ahn-Canton Regional 
Alhany County Airport 
Alhuquerque 





Baton Rouge Metropolitan 
Birmingham Municipal 
Blue Grass (Lexington, KY) 
Burbank-Glendde-Pasadena 
Bush Field (Augusta, GA) 




City of Colorado Springs 
Cleveland llopkins International 
Columbia Metropolitan (SC) 
Corpus Christi International 
Dallas-Ft. Worth International 
Dallas Love Field 
Dane County Regional (Madison, WI) 
Daytona Beach Regional 
Des Moines International 
Detroit Metropolitan 
El Paso International 
Eppley Airfield (Omaha, NE) 
Evansville Regional 






Fort Wayne Municipal (Fort Wayne. IN) 
Fresno Air Ternlinal 
General Fdward Lawrence (Boston, MA) 
General MitcheU Field (Milwaukee. WI) 
Greater Buffalo lnternational 
Greater Cincinnati lnternational 
Greater Pittsburgh lnternational 
Greensboro lligh Point (NC) 






James Cox Dayton lnternational 
John P. Kennedy lnternational 
John Wayne Airport (Santa Ana, CA) 
Kansas City lnternational 
Kent County lnternational (Grand Rapids, 
La Guardia 
Lamber-St. Louis lnternational 
Long Beach 
Long Island MacArthur 
Los Angeles lnternational 
LoveU Field (Chattanooga, TN) 
McCarran lnternational (Las  Vegas, NV) 
McGee Tyson (Knoxville,TN) 
Melbourne Regional (Melbourne, FL) 
Memphis lnternational 
I'er~nt~age  of Routes  Average Number of  . .  with Cornow  ~er  Route 
One-stop 
(all airlines)  Nonstop  One-stop  Nonstop  One-stop 
[3]  [4]  [  5 ]  [6]  171 
l lerfindahl Index 
Nonstop  One-stop 
[  8 ]  (91 
I4erfindahl Index 
Nonstop  One-stop 
[I 01  11 I] 
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Airport 
Nonstop  One-slop 
(all airlines)  (all airlines) 
Metropolitan Oakland 
Miami lnternational 




New Orleans lnternational 
Newark lnternational 
Ontario lnternational (CA) 
Orlando International 
Palm Beach lnternational 
Pensacola Regional 
Philadelphia International 
Phoenix Sky Ilarbor 
Port Columbus lnternational (Columbus, 011) 
Portland lnternational 
Quad City (Moline. L) 
Raleigh-Durham 
Richmond lnternational Airport (Byrd Field) (VA) 
Roanoke Regional (Woodrum Field) 
Robert Mueller (Austin,TX) 
Rochester--Monroe (Rochester, NY) 
Sacramento Metropolitan 
Salt Lake City lnternational 
San Antonio lnternational 
San Diego lnternational 
San Francisco lnternational 
San Jose lnternational 
Santa Barbara Municipal 
Sarasota-Bradenton Airport (Sarasota, FL) 
Savannah international 
I'ercentage of Routes  Average Number of  tlerfindahl Index 
. .  with Com~et~  s per Roulc  lovemu servicel 
Nonstop  One-stop  Nonstop  One-slop  Nonstop  One-slop 
[4]  IS]  (61  171  181  [9  1 
Herfindahl Index 
Nonstop  One-slop 
[I O]  [I I] 
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Airport 
Nonstop  One-stop 
(all airlines)  (all airlines) 
Seattle Tawma lnternational 
Shreveport Regional (LA) 
Southwest Florida Regional (Fort Myers, FL) 
Spokane lnternational 
Standiford Field (Louisville, KY) 
Stapleton lnternational (Denver, CO) 
St. Petersburg-Clearwater 
Syracuse tlanwck lnternational 
Tampa lnternational 







Will Rogers World (Oklahoma City, OK) 
Wiam  P.  Hobby (Houston.TX) 
Yeager Airport (Charleston. WV) 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Coefficient of Variation 
Percentage of Routes  Average Number of  Herfindahl lndex 
Nonstop  One-stop  Nonstop  One-stop  Nonstop  One-stop 
[4]  151  161  [7]  [8]  [9] 
Hertindahl lndex 
Nonstop  One-slop 
[lo]  [I 11 
Sources:  Various airline schedule guides, summer 1989, and authors' calculations. 
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